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TRIBAL SOLUTIONS TO ON-RESERVATION
ENVIRONMENTAL OFFENSES: JURISDICTIONAL
PARAMETERS, CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
Jennifer Smith Haner*
L Introduction
In 1991, U.S. Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), a member of the Senate Select
Committee on Indian Affairs, introduced the Indian Tribal Government Waste
Management Act (ITGWMA) in the Senate.' The bill proposed to inventory
all waste sites on tribal land, establish a program for technical assistance to
tribes, require the Secretary of the Interior's approval for all waste contracts,
and investigate a proposed waste company's past dumping record.' In
essence, the bill would have supplanted the role of tribal governments.
That same year, California State Assemblyman Steve Peace (D-Rancho San
Diego) proposed legislation which would have subjected Indian reservations
within California to state and local environmental laws? Like ITGWMA, the
"Peace Bill" would have displaced tribal governments' role in regulating the
reservation environment. The federal government and native peoples strongly
opposed the Peace Bill, and as a result, the bill was softened.4 The amended
bill, signed into law in 1991, provides that Indian tribes, the state, and local
communities may form "cooperative agreements," wherein Indian tribes
promise compliance with state and local environmental regulatory standards
in exchange for technical assistance Notably, upon entering a cooperative
agreement, tribes must waive their sovereign immunity.'
* Associate, Brady, Brooks & Smith, Salamanca, N.Y. J.D., 1993, University of Buffalo
School of Law; B.S., 1990, State University of New York at Buffalo. The author wishes to thank
Professors Errol E. Meidinger, John C. Mohawk, R. Nils Olsen, Jr., and Robert B. Porter for their
suggestions and encouragement which made this article possible.
1. S. 1687, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
2. Id. §§ 6(c)(e), 7(d).
3. See Ralph Frammolino, S.D. Legislators Draw Up Wish List for 1991, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
24, 1991, at BI.
4. See Len Hall, Ranchers Protest Planned Landfill on Indian Reservation, L.A. TiMEs, Aug.
25, 1992, at BI; Ralph Frammolino, Compromise Reached Over Indian Landfills, L.A. TIMES,
Sept. 11, 1991, at Al; Ralph Frammolino, U.S. Senator Says Bill on Indian Lands Is Doomed,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 1991, at B2.
5. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25198.1-.9 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994) (concerning
specifically the development of hazardous waste management facilities).
6. Id. § 25198.7(b). The statute states:
(b) The cooperative agreement shall require that the tribe waive its sovereign
inununity from any action brought by the state in any court otherwise having
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:ITGWMA and the Peace Bill represent the proverbial handwriting on the
wall. These bills were designed to address the widely held perception, often
fostered by the media, that native lands are being targeted for waste facilities
with alarming frequency and that many tribal governments are unable or
unwilling to regulate the reservation environment.7 If this perception of
ineptitude continues without contradiction, federal or state governments
eventually will feel the need to pass legislation to remedy the "problem."
In an article in the University of Colorado Law Review, Kevin Gover and
Jana Walker address the negative image portrayed in the media and criticize
the paternalistic belief that tribes are unable to consider and regulate
commercial waste projects In support of their position, they describe the
Carnpo Band of Mission Indians' proactive approach to siting a commercial
solid waste landfill and recycling facility near San Diego, California.' The
Band informed and educated the native community, developed an
environmental regulatory infrastructure, solicited companies, required that the
applicant company pay for the Band's financial advisors, lawyers, and solid
waste industry consultants, and ultimately negotiated a favorable contract.'"
Upon close examination, the Band's comprehensive and aggressive efforts are
clearly inconsistent with the negative image portrayed by the media.
Does this mean that all concerns about tribal environmental matters are
illegitimate? No, because not all tribes have been as successful as the Band."
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and that the state shall waive its sovereign
immunity from any action brought by the tribe, in any court otherwise having
jurisdiction over the subject matter, to enforce the terms of the cooperative
agreement.
Id. (emphasis added).
7. For examples of this type of media reporting, see Dan Fagin, Badland in Demand,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 21, 1991, at 5; Jonathan Littman, Indians Vulnerable to Outsiders Abuse, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 6, 1991, at A8; Mary Hager & Bill Harlen, Dances with Garbage, NEWSWEEK,
Apr. 29, 1991, at 36; Ralph Frammolino, Bill Would Curb Dumps on Reservations, L.A. TIMEs,
Apr. 3, 1992, at BIO ("Peace said the legislation is necessary to help thwart an unfolding strategy
by 'renegade' solid and hazardous waste firms to 'exploit' the sovereignty of California's Indian
tribes as a way around the state's stringent environmental standards."); Thomas A. Daschle,
Dances with Garbage, CHRISntAN SdL MONrrOR, Feb. 14, 1991, at 18.
8. Kevin Cover & Jana L. Walker, Escaping Environmental Paternalism: One Tribe's
Approach to Developing a Commercial Waste Disposal Project in Indian Country, 63 U. COLO.
L. Ri.v. 933 (1992).
9. Id. at 936-42.
10. Id. at 937-40.
11. An incident involving the Los Coyotes Band of Mission Indians of California
demonstrates the potential health, environmental, and economic harms duplicative commercial
operators pose. In 1990, the Los Coyotes Tribal Chairman was allegedly tricked into signing a
500-acre landfill agreement with Chambers Corp. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The tribal
Chairman was allegedly told that he was authorizing preliminary environmental landfill testing,
not signing a contract. The company's deceptive tactics with the tribal government was not all
that the LOs Coyotes suffered. The terms of the forty-one page contract were "unconscionable,"
exploiting the economically disadvantaged tribe and endangering their safety and environment.
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Moreover, tribal-authorized commercial operators are not the greatest threat
to the reservation environment. As Gover and Walker recognize:
To set the record straight, the bigger problem is not that the
waste industry is beating a path to the tribal door. Rather, it is
the unauthorized and illegal dumping occurring on reservations.
For most Indian communities the problem of open dumping on
tribal lands is of much greater concern than the remote prospect
that a commercial waste disposal facility may be sited on a
reservation. 2
This article addresses the "bigger problem" of illegal operators who
exploit the reservation environment and community, and it cautions that
unless tribal governments deal with these operators adequately, federal or
state governments will seek to regulate the operators. With these aims, part
II identifies the illegal operators and describes their activities. Part III
examines tribal, federal, and state jurisdiction issues which impact the
parameters of tribal regulation of illegal operators, and which highlight the
risk of state justification for on-reservation authority. Traditional native law
and cultural dynamics are the focus of part IV. Lastly, part V provides
recommendations for tribal environmental regulation.
I. Illegal Operators: Who Are They?
This article will address two classes of illegal operators, "midnight
dumpers" and "native entrepreneurs." "Midnight dumpers" acquired their
name by secreting waste on the reservation without tribal authorization.
"Native entrepreneur" is the term for tribal members who operate waste
facilities without tribal permission for their own personal gain or
convenience. 3 Both midnight dumpers and native entrepreneurs pose
serious threats to tribal health and safety, and, as will be discussed in part
III, tribal sovereignty. They have been known to dump very toxic materials,
such as asbestos and pesticides, in Indian country. 4 Thus, the environment
It provided for low safety standards, unlimited landfill expansion, and return of all compensation
if the tribe breached the contract. Ralph Frammolino & Amy Wallace, Landfill Lease an Indian
Land has Substandard Controls, L.A. TiMEs, April 14, 1991, at BI. The deal was ultimately
nullified after strong tribal opposition. Roberts Worthington, Tribes Resisting Tempting Landfill
Offers, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 1991, at C4.
12. Gover & Walker, supra note 8, at 934.
13. For the purposes of this article, a "waste facility" may be something as complex as a
sludge-spreading operation or as simple as an open lot where garbage is thrown.
14. Bill Lambrecht, Illegal Dumpers Scar Indian Land, ST. Louis PoST-DisPATCH, Nov. 17,
1991, at I IA (relating the discovery of 400 bags of asbestos and pesticide barrels placed by
midnight dumpers) thereinafter Lambrecht. Illegal Dumpers]; see also Judith G. Murakami.
Comment, Dances with Waste: Criminal Prosecution of Midnight Dumping in Indian Country,
19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 541, 547 (1992) ("Midnight dumping of hazardous waste on Indian
No. 1]
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is adversely impacted, and the community is unaware of the potential
hazards.
Midnight dumping appears to be a fairly widespread and recurrent
problem. For example, the Gila River Reservation of Arizona averages
seventeen serious clandestine dumpings a year." To combat this problem
on the Onondaga Reservation within New York, an individual tribal member
polices the reservation. 6 The solution for many Native American
governments, however, may not be this simple. Land holdings often are vast
and relatively unpopulated. It would be impossible for only one person to
police all the lands; the problem exceeds the means of benevolent vigilantes.
Tribes should take affirmative steps to prevent clandestine dumping
operations instead of relying on the goodwill of community volunteers. In
response to the problem of midnight dumpers, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has earmarked $30,000 to train Native Americans to handle
hazardous materials." Although this training is important, it is does not
address the root of the problem, which is illegal dumping itself. To combat
this form of illegal dumping, midnight dumpers must be persuaded that the
risks and costs of being caught outweigh the financial benefits.
Native entrepreneurs who 'operate without .tribal permission or tribal,
federal, or state oversight also must be dissuaded from continuing their
illegal practices. 8  These parties often operate without sufficient
understanding of the risks associated with incoming wastes, and as a result
are unable to adequately self-regulate. Graphically illustrating an
entrepreneur's failure to appreciate the magnitude of his decision to accept
waste, an Onondaga tribal member took $50 in exchange for dumping lead-
filled sandblasting waste material which otherwise would have cost the
company $25,000.9
Native entrepreneurs are especially problematic since there is no
meaningful policing of their operations. As with cigarettes, gasoline, and
gambling, entrepreneurs are taking advantage of an enforcement loophole.
Environmental regulatory enforcement is not undertaken by states because
they have not established jurisdiction."0 Tribal environmental controls do
not exist or are more lenient on tribal members. Federal laws often go
unenforced. Because entrepreneurs take advantage of enforcement
reservations in California is a growing problem.").
15. Lambrecht. Illegal Dumpers, supra note 14.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Arguably, native entrepreneurs are not acting illegally if there are no tribal environmental
ordinances or any federal laws covering the activity. Illegal or not, bringing noxious and
sometimes deadly substances onto a reservation is potentially harmful and the tribe should
regulate the activity.
19. Lambrecht, Illegal Dumpers, supra note 14.
20. See infra part III.C.
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loopholes, other tribal members become frustrated and occasionally take
vigilante action. At a 1992 conference sponsored by the Native American
Indian Alliance at the State University of New York at Buffalo, "Dumping
on Native American Lands," a native woman told of her participation in an
organized effort to keep waste haulers off the reservation at gunpoint."
These regulatory loopholes need to be addressed by tribal governments
before intra-tribal political disputes rage, native people and environment
suffer further, or the federal or state government take control.
III. Jurisdictional Quagmire
Jurisdictional disputes among tribal, federal, and state governments are
common in all areas of federal Indian law. The hottest debates, however,
usually are between state and tribal governments. There is no uniform rule
about which of these two governments has authority, and therefore, a
particularized inquiry is required in every context, from cigarette taxation
to environmental regulation. As such, jurisdictional questions are
complicated and lack high predictability. Despite the inherent imprecision,
jurisdictional analysis is a prerequisite to recommending tribal response to
illegal operators because state jurisdiction impacts the parameters of tribal
authority. Furthermore, such analysis demonstrates that state jurisdiction is
more likely if tribal governments fail to regulate on-reservation illegal
operators.
Unlike state environmental jurisdiction questions, federal jurisdiction is
predictable. In short, the federal government's authority is preeminent over
both tribal and state claims of authority. The current federal policy of
encouraging Indian self-determination, however, is inconsistent with the on-
reservation exercise of federal power. This contradiction must be explored
because it influences the allowable scope of tribal environmental programs
which address illegal dumping operations.
It is self-evident that a tribe's authority over Indians and non-Indians
frames its regulation of native entrepreneurs and midnight dumpers. Indeed,
it is just this authority that this article urges tribes to take advantage of to
curb illegal dumping.
A. Tribal Authority
Tribal power to protect the reservation environment is rooted in inherent
tribal sovereignty, not in delegation of authority from the United States. 2
Indeed, treaties and federal statutes are not a source of tribal authority, but
a limit thereon.' Stated in the converse, Native American governments
21. Author's notes, Conference on Dumping on Native American Lands, State University of
New York at Buffalo (Apr. 10-11, 1992).
22. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
23. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 122 (Rennard Strickland et al.
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
retain all power not taken away by treaty, federal statute, or the courts.24 As
an extension of this principle, native governments retain authority over
members unless divested by the federal government.'
Tribal governments also possess civil jurisdiction over non-Indians who are
on the reservation, subject only to a few exceptions. The U.S. Supreme Court
announced the test in National Farmers Union Insurance v. Crow Tribe:'
[The existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will
require a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to
which that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished,
as well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch
policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and administrative
or judicial decisions.
Significantly, the Court also provided: "We believe that examination [of
tribal court jurisdiction] should be conducted in the first instance in the Tribal
Court itself."'  Further bolstering tribal court authority, the Court held that
exhaustion of tribal court remedies is required before tribal court jurisdiction
quistions may be entertained by a federal court."
Iowa Mutual Insurance v. LaPlante" strengthens tribal court civil
authority even further. There, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that federal
courts could only review tribal court determinations of jurisdiction, not
substantive issues: "Unless a federal court determines that the Tribal Court
lacked jurisdiction, however, proper deference to the tribal court system
precludes relitigation of issues raised by the LaPlante's bad-faith claim and
eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN]; see also United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978)
("Tie powers of Indian tribes are, in general, inherent powers ofa limited sovereignty which have
never been extinguished") (quoting COHEN, supra, at 122).
24. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323; Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987).
25. Compare Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (holding tribe has criminal
juri:sdiction over murder of Indian by another Indian) with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153(a) (West Supp.
1994) (divesting tribal jurisdiction over murder committed by Indian upon Indians).
Because tribal governments retain all power that is not divested, federal grants of authority
to tribes are only necessary when the tribe was previously divested of authority. Nevertheless,
the federal government has granted pollution control authority to tribal governments over tribal
environmental matters. See David F. Coursen, Tribes as States: Indian Tribal Authority To
Regulate and Enforce Federal Environmental Laws and Regulations, [23 News & Analysis]
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,579, 10,586-87 (1993). Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court
has upheld federal delegation of authority to Indian tribes. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544 (1975) (holding that Congress may delegate to Indian tribes the regulatory power over
distribution of alcohol).
26. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
27. IM at 855-56 (footnote omitted).
28. Id. at 856.
29. Id. at 856-57.
30. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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resolved in the Tribal Courts."'" Together, these cases create a strong
grounding for civil authority over non-Indians. "[A]II agree that National
Farmers Union and Iowa Mutual will make it harder to challenge tribal court
authority.""
A limited exception to tribal civil authority over non-Indians was created
by Montana v. United States." The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Crow
Tribe of Montana could not regulate hunting within reservation boundaries by
nonmembers on land owned by the nonmembers in fee simple.' The Court
reasoned: "[E]xercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express
congressional delegation.""3 Furthermore, the Court was influenced by the
tribe's past acquiescence to the State's "near exclusive" regulation of hunting
and fishing on fee land.' The Court, however, did not find that there was
lack of tribal authority over non-Indians in all instances: "To be sure, Indian
tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee
lands.""7 Following from this, the Court pronounced two exceptions to the
presumption against tribal authority:
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means,
the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members who enter consensual relationships
with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain
inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-
Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect upon the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe?'
Environmental and resource concerns have generally satisfied this second
exception in lower court decisions." For example, the Ninth Circuit Court
31. Id. at 19.
32. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 423 (3rd
ed. 1991).
33. 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
34. Id.
35. Id. at 564.
36. Id. at 566.
37. Id. at 565.
38. Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
39. See, e.g., Cardin v. De La Cruz, 671 F.2d 363, 367 (9th Cir. 1982). cert. denied, 459
U.S. 967 (1982) (holding tribal building, health, and safety codes apply to non-Indians on their
fee land); Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation v. Namen, 665 P.2d
951, 967 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 997 (1982) (upholding tribal regulation of riparian
rights); Lummi Indian Tribe v. Hallauer, 9 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program)
No. 1]
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of Appeals in Cardin v. De La Cruz held that tribal building, health, and
safety codes applied to non-Indians on non-Indian owned fee land because,
inter alia, tribal health and safety were otherwise at risk.4 Furthermore, if
tribal governments have jurisdiction over non-Indians on fee land who threaten
tribal health and safety, then surely tribal governments have jurisdiction over
non-Indians on non-fee lands who threaten tribal health and safety.
In contrast to tribal civil authority, tribal criminal authority over non-
Indians was obviated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1978. In Oliphant v.
Suquamish Indian Tribe,42 the Court held that tribal governments do not have
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Suffering a further diminishment of the
power to deter and punish non-Indian (and Indian) activities that harm tribal
health and environment, the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) placed
a limit of six months imprisonment or $1000 (since increased to one year and
$5000) on tribal penalties or punishments for any one offense."3
In summary, tribal governments have civil authority over on-reservation
environmental matters. Under notions of inherent sovereignty, tribal
governments have jurisdiction over their members, including native
entrepreneurs. As well, non-Indian midnight dumpers are within tribal civil
jurisdiction based upon notions of National Farmers Union and Montana.
Tribal criminal authority over non-Indians and their ability to penalize have
been stifled by Oliphant and ICRA.
B. Federal Authority
Congress asserts authority to unilaterally enact laws affecting native people,
lands, and governments.' This is referred to as the "federal plenary
3025 (W.D. Wash. 1982) (upholding tribal sewer hook-up requirements).
40. 671 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982).
41. Jd. at 366.
42. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
43. Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (codified as amended
at 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302 (West Supp. 1994).
44. See MeClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973). The basis for federal
authority in Indian country is the dual fictions of discovery and conquest. Judith V. Royster &
Rory S. Faussett, Control of the Reservation Environment: Tribal Primacy Federal Delegation,
and the Limits of State Intrusion, 64 WASH. L. REv. 581, 585 (1989). These concepts were
fomiulated in the early nineteenth century by Chief Justice Marshall in Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), a case finding that native lands can only be alienated to the United
States government. Justice Marshall rationalized that by the theory of discovery, the absolute title
to land goes to the "discoverer," the United States. Id. at 587. Indians only retain occupancy
rights. Id. at 574. Next, Marshall reasoned that the United States conquered the Indians nations,
and therefore, the United States preempted any other party when the Indian nations chose to
alienate their land. Id. at 591. Expanding on these notions of superiority, Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831) relegated Indian nations to the status of "domestic dependent
nations." Id. at 17. Thus, the United States went from discovering nation to superior sovereign.
gairing more and more authority over Indian nations. Royster & Faussett, supra, at 581. From
this perceived super-ordinate sovereignty came the perceived right of the federal government to
[Vol. 19
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power."4 This doctrine of absolute power, which includes even the power to
abolish an Indian tribe's recognized existence, has been justified as a
constitutionally confirmed right' As a facet of this power, federal
environmental laws and regulations specifically enacted to affect native
peoples or lands are applicable in Indian country." For example, the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 9 is applicable to native
lands and may be enforced against Indian tribes as determined by Blue Legs
v. EPA." Blue Legs subjected the Oglala Sioux Tribe to a RCRA citizen suit
because the statute allows suit to be brought against a "municipality," which
includes an "Indian tribe."'" Congress specifically included Indian tribes
within RCRA's purview, and thus, native governments are bound by it. 2
At one time, general federal laws were without force in Indian country. 3
By 1960, however, Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation'
found that "it is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a
general statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their
property interests."55 This case concerned an application by the State of New
regulate within reservation boundaries. Id. at 587.
45. See Lone Wolfe v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (finding congressional power
to abrogate a treaty). "Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has been exercised
by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always been deemed a political one, not
subject to control by the judicial department of the government." Id.
46. Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713,719 (1983) ("[The sovereignty of Indian tribes] exists only
at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.") (quoting United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313,323 (1978)) (emphasis in Rice); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S.
49, 56 (1978) ("Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local
self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.").
47. See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886) (finding congressional power to
require crimes such as murder be heard by federal tribunal). However, commentators question
this justification and pose that it is just an exertion of a stronger nation's raw power over a
weaker nation. See Royster & Faussett, supra note 44, at 587 n.13 (citing United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 384-85 (1886)).
48. See Blue Legs v. EPA, 668 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.C.), affd sub nom. Blue Legs v. BIA,
867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1987).
49. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901-6992k (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
50. 668 F. Supp. 1329 (D.S.D. 1987), affd sub nom. Blue Legs v. BIA, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th
Cir. 1989).
51. Id. at 1337; see also 42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(13)(A) (West 1983).
52. Similarly, the Clean Water Act and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) define
"municipality" to include "an Indian tribe." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(4) (West 1986) (Clean Water
Act); 42 U.S.C.A. 300f(10) (West 1991) (SDWA). Following the holding of Blue Legs, these
statute would also be applicable in Indian country. See Jana L. Walker & B. Kevin Cover, Tribal
Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction to Enforce Environmental Laws, in ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL
LAW FOUND., MINERAL DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 14-1, 14-11 (1991) (stating that Clean
Water Act and SDWA are applicable). In fact, the SDWA has been held applicable to native
lands. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986).
53. See Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 100 (1884).
54. 362 U.S. 99 (1960).
55. Id. at 116.
No. 1]
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York to the Federal Power Commission for a licenses to flood fee simple
lands of the Tuscarora Indian Nation. A license was granted according to the
Foeral Power Act.' The Court reasoned, in part, that the Federal Power Act
was a "complete and comprehensive plan" and therefore should apply within
native lands.? From this decision emerged the Tuscarora rule, which
provides that federal statutes of general applicability also apply within native
territorial boundaries. To satisfy the Tuscarora rule, the federal law must
evidence a statutory scheme requiring national or uniform application, or the
legislative history or surrounding circumstances must clearly reflect
congressional intent to invade tribal rights and authority.5'" As is relevant to
tribal environmental regulation, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)" does not specifically include tribal peoples or
land within its purview. However, under Tuscarora, this general
environmental law is likely applicable within Indian country because it
requires national and uniform application.'
Despite broad federal authority over on-reservation environmental matters,
federal power is restrained internally. The 1984 EPA Indian policy effectively
called for this restraint.6 ' The purpose of the policy is to promote tribal self-
government.' Although not strictly binding on the federal government, this
policy has played a role in guarding tribal sovereignty.'
In sum, several federal environmental statutes and regulations have been
amended to include native lands and peoples, yet some still do not. Those
which do are applicable in Indian country under the plenary power doctrine,
and those which do not are probably applicable under the Tuscarora rule.
Thus, the federal government has jurisdiction over midnight dumpers' and
native entrepreneurs' activities which fall within the scope of these federal
56. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 791a-828 (West 1985 & Supp. 1994).
57. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. at 118.
58. COHEN, supra note 23, at 283; see also Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
While the Tuscarora rule is harsh, it is softened by interpreting federal general laws to
conform with treaties. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986). Given this restriction,
occasionally general federal laws are inapplicable on native lands. See, e.g., Donovan v. Navajo
Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709 (10th Cir., 1982) (holding the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 not applicable to native business because there was no clear legislative intent to
abrogate the treaty with the Navajo Tribe). However, exceptions are few and "there is relatively
unquestioning acceptance that most general federal laws apply in Indian country," Royster &
Faussett, supra note 44, at 592.
59. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
60. Cf. Walker & Gover, supra note 52, at 14-10.
61.. See generally Eric D. Eberhard, Environmental Protection Agency Indian Policy and
Recent Legislative Developments, in ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUND., MINERAL
DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 15-5 to 15-9, 15-25 to 15-28 (1989) (discussing the EPA policy
and providing a copy of the policy in full).
62. Id. at 15-5.
63. See infra part III.C.
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environmental laws. The federal government, however, may be restrained
from exerting its authority because of the current federal policy favoring
Indian self-determination. Tribal governments should exert their power of
self-determination and firmly establish their role in regulating the reservation
environment during a period of federal restraint. Federal Indian policy has
changed drastically and rapidly in the past and has been exceedingly intrusive
on tribal government (e.g., the Allotment Act period). 4 If the federal
government perceives that tribal governments are inadequately addressing
environmentally hazardous activities, its reluctance to exert federal authority
might pass, and so might bills like ITGWMA.
C. State Authority
States have limited jurisdiction within Indian country, but the extent of that
jurisdiction is not firmly established.' State jurisdiction is dependent upon
a particularized factual inquiry into each new regulatory issue raised. State
authority is determined by the application of a two-part test, the
'infringement/preemption" test.M As the U.S. Supreme Court, in White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,67 states:
[C]ongressional authority and the "semi-dependent position" of
Indian tribes have given rise to two independent but related
barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over tribal
reservations and members. First, the exercise of such authority
may be pre-empted by federal laws. Second, it may unlawfully
infringe "on the right of reservation Indians to make their own
laws and be ruled by them."'
The Supreme Court has demonstrated a preference for the first leg of this
test, stating in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,' "[The trend
has been away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a bar to state
64. See generally RUSSELL L. BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON, THE ROAD:
INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY (1980) (delineating time periods, treatment of Indians,
and United States federal Indian policy).
65. A state's assertion of on-reservation regulatory authority stems from its refusal to
recognize reservations as extraterritorial of state borders. Royster & Faussett, supra note 44. at
600. From approximately 1832 until 1959, states did not have authority within Indian Country
because of the preference for federal authority in the field of Indian affairs. In Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832), the Court held that Georgia's laws were without force on
Cherokee lands because they violated the U.S. Constitution, federal treaties, and federal law. Id.
at 596. Marking a departure from the "territorial approach" of Worcester, the Court in Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), allowed states on-reservation authority if the state action did not
infringe Indian rights. Id. at 220.
66. Royster & Faussett, supra note 44, at 601.
67. 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
68. Id. at 142 (citations omitted).
69. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1994
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption.""0 Therefore,
emphasis is placed on whether state actions have been preempted by federal
law.
States are preempted from regulating native activities which Congress has
already explicitly regulated. As relevant here, Congress has deemed that
Indian tribes (meeting certain minimum standards) be treated as states in
approximately half the federal pollution control acts.7 The Clean Water
Act,' Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA),' the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA),74 and the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA)' provide that tribes be treated as states, albeit
many of the tribal grants have restrictions.76 In addition, the Clean Air Act
and FIFRA" delegate primary authority over limited programs to tribes."
Because Congress has explicitly granted authority to tribes, state jurisdiction
within Indian country is expressly preempted by Congress."'
States can be preempted by operation of federal law even if a federal
statute or treaty does not explicitly regulate the same activity.' Where there
is no explicit congressional directive, the Supreme Court considers several
factors to determine state authority on reservations. The Court balances tribal,
federal, and state interests in regulating the activity, assessing the burdens and
interests of each party. Also, the Court may regard traditional notions of
native sovereignty," the federal policy of promoting tribal sovereignty, self-
70. Id. at 172; see also Rice v. Rehener, 463 U.S. 713, 718 (1983) ("We have... employed
a pre-emption analysis that is informed by historical notions of tribal sovereignty, rather than
determined by them.").
71. See Royster & Faussett, supra note 44, at 619. Until 1986, federal environmental statutes
did not delegate authority to tribal governments to act as states. See Gover & Walker, supra note
8, at 934. Because Indian tribes were not explicitly included or excluded, federal law did not
expnssly preempted state authority within native territorial boundaries. As such, states could
argue for jurisdiction.
72. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1377 (West Supp. 1994).
73. 30 U.S.C.A. § 1235(k) (vest Supp. 1994).
74. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300j-ll(a)(l) (West 1991).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 9626 (West Supp. 1994).
76. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. 300j-1 l(b)(2) (West 1991) (SDWA); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1377(e) (West
Supp. 1994) (Clean Water Act).
77. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401-7671g (West 1983 & Supp. 1994).
78. 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 136-136y (West 1980 & Supp. 1994).
79. The Clean Air Act delegates authority to redesignate air shed quality, 42 U.S.C.A. §
7474(c) (West 1983), and FIFRA allows tribes to enter a cooperative agreement with the EPA
to enforce the Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 136u(a) (West 1980).
80. Royster & Faussett, supra note 44, at 625-26; see Jones v. Rath Packaging Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977).
111. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 144 (1980) ("We have thus
rejected the proposition that in order to find a particular state law to have been pre-empted by
operation of federal law, an express congressional statement to that effect is required,"); see also
Wanen Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
82. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145; McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172
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sufficiency, and economic development,' as well as the native nation's
historical role in controlling the activity.' Because some factors of the
"infringement/preemption" test are case specific, a universal outcome cannot
be predicted." Here, identification and weighing of general federal, tribal,
and state interests, and analysis of tribes' historical tribal roles in regulating
the reservation environment will be conducted. 6
Federal interests in pollution control within Indian country include ensuring
satisfaction of minimal federal pollution standards, preventing tribal lands
from becoming state dumping grounds," and promoting tribal sovereignty
(1973) ("The Indian sovereignty doctrine... provides a backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statute must be read.").
83. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143-44 ("Ambiguities in federal law have been construed
generously in order to comport with these traditional notions of sovereignty and with the federal
policy of encouraging tribal independence.").
84. Rice v. Rehener, 463 U.S. 713, 722 (1983) ("[Tradition simply has not recognized a
sovereign immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor regulation by Indians.").
85. An interesting debate has raged over RCRA, a federal pollution control statute in which
Congress has failed to designate any authority to tribal nations explicitly: Does RCRA preempt
state authority over on-reservation activities that are within the normal purview of RCRA? In
1980, the EPA announced that states lacked authority to regulate waste on native lands unless
they could prove otherwise. Royster & Faussett, supra note 44, at 630-31. The State of
Washington tried to assert authority, but the EPA rejected it, and Washington brought suit. Id.
at 631-32. In Washington Dep't of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985), the U.S.
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the EPA's refusal to allow state authority was proper.
Id. at 1467. Their rationale was based on principles of administrative law supported by
interpretation of federal Indian law, wherein the Court concluded that the EPA's decision was not
arbitrary and capricious. Washington Dep't of Ecology is distinguishable because it was an
administrative review, and it only considered Indians, not non-Indians, on reservations. See Leslie
Allen, Who Should Control Hazardous Waste on Native American Lands? Looking Beyond
Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 69 (1987).
Washington Dep't of Ecology has drawn a great amount of attention and debate from the legal
community and academics. See e.g., Allen, supra; Catherine E. Pope, Note, 27 NAT. RESOURCES
J. 739 (1987); Mark Allen, Comment, Native American Control of Tribal Natural Resources
Developments in the Context of the Federal Trust and Tribal Self-Determination, 16 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 857 (1989); Steven M. Christenson, Note, Regulatory Jurisdiction over Non-Indian
Hazardous Waste in Indian Country, 72 IOWA L. REv. 1091 (1987); Richard A. Du Bey et al.,
Protection of the Reservation Environment: Hazardous Waste Management on Indian Lands, 18
ENvTL. L. 449 (1988).
86. The above factors used in the "infringement/preemption" test represent the Supreme
Court's typical rationale in determinations of a state's power to regulate native activities.
However, the test is not mechanical or predictable. "Where is no rigid rule by which to resolve
the question whether a particular state law may be applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal
members." White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Brucker, 488 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). Thus, analysis
of state authority within Indian country can only be informed by past court decisions; the
outcome cannot be predicted with certainty.
87. Counterpart to some state health and safety laws are statewide hazardous waste siting
provisions. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 27-1101 to 27-1115 (McKinney 1984 &
Supp. 1994). Under these siting provisions, an area is targeted according to arbitrary standards,
and a waste facility can be sited in that chosen locale, regardless of community opposition or
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and self-sufficiency."5 Native interests include tribal health and welfare,
control over tribal environment and development, responsiveness to tribal
priorities, protection from off-reservation spillover, and prevention of tribal
lands from becoming state dumping grounds."' Against these federal and
tribal interests, state protectionist and economic interests must be balanced.
State interests include the prevention of pollution spillovers and concern
about tribal economic advantage from less stringent (or lack of) tribal
standards." For example, leniency in, or lack of, tribal environmental
regulation would substantially strengthen a state's claim that its constituents'
health and safety are at risk from on-reservation pollution spillovers.
This balancing test is to be completed against a backdrop of traditional
notions of sovereignty, making state authority less likely. Also weighing
against state authority is the federal policy to encourage tribal self-
determination, economic independence, and sovereignty."' The next factor
in the "infringement/preemption" test, however, cannot be favorably
predicted. A tribe's traditional role in regulating the activity is not
conclusively established by all tribal groups. Indeed, a purpose of this
article is to encourage wide establishment of tribal regulation of illegal
operator's activities. Arguably, tribes without environmental protection
mechanisms do not have a traditional role in regulating the reservation
environment. It may be suggested, however, that even absent formalized
written environmental laws, tribes have cultural norms guiding their
interaction with nature, and that these demonstrate a traditional role in
regulating the environment.
Considering all the facets of the test together - each party's interests,
traditional notions of sovereignty, federal policy, and the tribe's historical
role in the activity - it is uncertain how a court would conclude in every
case. Federal policy and tribal health concerns do not favor state
jurisdiction. But, absence of tribal environmental regulation makes state
health arguments stronger and, since the tribe's historical role is a factor of
the test itself, state jurisdiction is more likely. Thus, it is possible that a
state could gain regulatory authority, particularly if tribal and federal
enforcement is absent.'
community laws which prohibit such facilities. If state regulatory authority is confirmed, natives
could find their land as a repository for intrastate and interstate hazardous waste because they
have been traditionally mistreated, and they often live in remote, politically weak areas.
88. See Royster & Faussett, supra note 44, at 649-50.
89. Id. at 650-52.
90. Id. at 652-53.
91. California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216 (1987); see also
Royster & Faussett, supra note 44, at 647.
92. See Murakami, supra note 14, at 557-58 (stating that California could have jurisdiction
to prosecute Indian or non-Indian midnight dumpers). The location of the regulated activity and
the party also greatly impacts jurisdictional questions. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
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D. Jurisdictional Overview
Based upon notions of inherent sovereignty, tribal governments have
authority over members, and over non-Indians based upon notions from
National Farmers Union and Montana.3 Thus, tribal governments have
authority over native entrepreneurs and midnight dumpers. Furthermore,
tribal authority is supported by the federal policy of Indian self-
determination. Despite their authority, there is evidence that native
governments have a problem with illegal dumping. Many tribal
governments have failed to stop the illegal activity, which threatens tribal
environment and community.
Federal environmental statutes are applicable under either plenary power
rationale (i.e., when the statute expressly regards Indian tribes or lands) or
under the Tuscarora rule (i.e., when the statute is intended to be of uniform
national application)." The federal policy promoting self-determination,
however, contradicts this power. This inconsistency may account for the
EPA's lack of regulatory enforcement of federal pollution laws."
State authority, in contrast to tribal and federal authority, is uncertain.
Although in many cases state authority is expressly preempted by federal
pollution control laws, in the absence of such federal law, state authority
could be exerted. If a tribal government and the federal government are
lenient in environmental enforcement, state authority over tribal lands is
more likely. Thus, the existence of state authority is dependent upon the
degree of the federal or tribal authority exerted.
As applied to the problem of on-reservation illegal operators, tribal
governments need to exert the authority they possess, or they may lose it
to the states. Furthermore, a degree of authority has already been lost to the
federal government in theory because federal environmental laws have been
enacted which apply on native lands. As long as the federal laws, however,
are unenforced, tribal governments have a window to create and enforce
their own laws which fit their needs and philosophies. If the federal
government finds that tribal schemes meets federal environmental concerns,
albeit through different means, the federal government is unlikely to change
its present position of inaction.
544 (1981); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Band of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,
2994 (1989); see also Peter W. Sly, EPA and Indian Reservations: Justice Stevens' Factual
Approach, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,429 (Oct. 1990); Craighton Goepple, Comment,
Solutions for Uneasy Neighbors: Regulating the Reservation Environment After Brendale v.
Confederated Tribes & Band of Yakima Indian Nation, 65 WASH. L. REv. 417 (1990).
93. See supra part III.A.
94. See supra part III.B.
95. See Allen, supra note 85, at 74, 110 n.249; see also Bill Lambrecht, Indians Say EPA
Not Doing Enough, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 18, 1991, at 8A ("LT]he EPA's failure in
Indian country precipitated an uprising within the agency.").
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IV. Traditional Law and Custom and Cultural Dynamics
As complex jurisdictional considerations affect tribal response to native
entrepreneurs and midnight dumpers, so do numerous internal tribal
considerations. Tribal governments must balance wishes for retaining an
independent identity, honoring past traditions, adapting to present needs, and
resisting subsumption into Euro-America. To meet these aims, traditional
ways and philosophies should be respected and expounded upon,
transforming the old ways into the new. Cultural stasis is not recommended.
Cultures are dynamic, and to survive they must change along with their
technological, social, economic, and ecological environments. Change,
however, should not equate with adopting Euro-American methods and
philosophies wholesale. Native governments are unique, possessing their
own strengths and weaknesses. To adopt Euro-American methods and
philosophies wholesale would be to deny their strengths and uniqueness.
Tribal governments, ideally, could build off their traditional strengths and
adjust for their weaknesses.
In People of the Deer, author Farley Mowat tells of Kakumee, an
Ihalmuit Eskimo, who left his isolated village camp and returned with goods
from white traders, materialism, and plague.96 Kakumee was "The Breaker
of Law."'97 Immediately upon his return, he violated, first, "a law as old as
life" that a man shared what he had with his neighbors, and, second, the law
that one does not strike another in anger." In a frenzied attempt to prevent
his brother from walking off with a rifle, Kakumee struck his brother with
an axe. He then declared that all the goods were his and threatened the life
of anyone who argued otherwise." Kakumee terrorized his people from that
day forward, stealing their children, women, food, and weapons. His people
considered him a "madman" and feared him, never rebuking him or trying
to stop his evil ways.
The plague Kakumee returned with decimated his people, yet Kakumee
was seemingly immune. When his starving people approached him for food
or return of a rifle that he had stolen, Kakumee would turn them away or
shoot them." His people were a quickly dying race, yet Kakumee was
never in want. However, Kakumee was as empty as were his possessions
and greed. After visiting Kakumee's tents and seeing hoards of rusted and
useless white men's goods that Kakumee had spent his life voraciously
accumulating, Mowat writes: "I was appalled, for it was not simply the
96. FARLEY MOWAT, PEOPLE OF THE DEER 186-97 (1975).
97. Id. at 186.
98. Id. at 189.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 192-93.
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material wealth of one man I saw, but the wealth of a race, piled there to
decay and to pass into dust that one's man passion might be well fed.'...
Like Kakumee, avaricious midnight dumpers and native entrepreneurs
threaten tribal health and cultural existence by making foreign government
on-reservation authority more likely. Many reservation communities
experience desperate economic conditions, making members susceptible to
the lure of money from exploiting weak federal and tribal environmental
enforcement. It is especially problematic that almost an entire native group
could adhere to its traditional laws and bypass this temptation, yet one
avaricious illegal operator could destroy reservation environment and health,
as well as threaten tribal sovereignty.
Greed is a strong and pervasive force in today's society. However, greed
and materialism were foreign to many native peoples pre-contact. It follows
that these characteristics would not be addressed as strongly by traditional
native law and custom as they may need to be addressed today. Many
native cultures have changed and, as is natural, continue to change as their
people change. The law which guides these people must keep pace with
these changes in order to protect those who abide by it willfully.
V. Recommendations
For several reasons native entrepreneurs and midnight dumpers are a
problem for many native governments. First, tribes often have little or no
leverage with the illegal operators, particularly if tribes do not have an
environmental regulatory infrastructure with adequate enforcement
mechanisms. Second, reservation communities generally experience
desperate economic conditions and lack the funds and personnel for a
meaningful regulatory program." z Finally, some reservations have small
populations and large land holdings so that illegal activities are easily
hidden from the reservation community."w A solution to illegal dumping
must, therefore, address the absence of proactive institutions, the lack of
financial resources and personnel, and the practicalities of reservation life.
A uniform proactive means of addressing siting and regulation concerns
is difficult to recommend because there are variables which differ from
Native American group to group. For example, the infrastructure of tribal
governments varies widely," treaties are often unique to specific Native
101. Id. at 197.
102. Cf. Bill Lambrecht, Poisoned Mandate... Government FaiLv in Its Legally Etablished
Role av Protector of Indians, ST. Louis POST DISPATCH, Nov. 17, 1991, at 1. [hereinafter
Lambrecht, Poisoned Mandate].
103. See Murakami, supra note 14, at 547.
104. For example, the Seneca Nation of Indians and the Tonawanda Band of Senecas,
although of the same heritage and in close geographic proximity, have very different forms of
government. The Seneca Nation of Indians have a constitutional form of government, and
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American groups,"0 and parties introducing waste onto Native American
land may receive different treatment by tribal governments. One native
group's approach to the problems of native entrepreneurs and midnight
dumpers will serve only to inform other groups, not provide mechanical
solutions. Therefore, a broad array of alternatives will be proposed for
consideration so that numerous native groups may find utility in this article.
Perhaps the ideas presented below may even spark thought about different
approaches to the pervasive problem of illegal dumping.
A. Euro-American-Style Institutions
To address the problems of native entrepreneurs and midnight dumpers,
native governments could exert more authority over illegal operators by
utilizing an Euro-American-style approach. That is, native governments
could create laws to regulate or prohibit such operations, take offenders to
tribal court and secure judgments against them, and increase police power
over offenders. The relatively recent proliferation of constitutional tribal
governments and tribal courts provide a ready framework for such a system.
Furthermore, because this is a Euro-American-style approach, it would
probably hold legitimacy in the eyes of federal and state governments. This
approach, however, could conflict with traditional native methods of
addressing deviant behavior and may be rejected by native peoples.""
The perspectives of the external governments and the regulated peoples
are important to the viability of a tribal regulatory system. The tribal
program must be credible to external governments in order to discourage
their intrusion, yet the laws must be respected by those it regulates to be
effective. Professor Frank Pommersheim argues that a fundamental element
of these Euro-American-style institutions, adjudication in tribal courts, is
gaining legitimacy in a social, historical, and° cultural context.'"
Tonawanda Band of Senecas have a traditional form of government. COHEN, supra note 23, at
422-23.
105. See 2 CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 3-1074 (AMS ed.
1971) (1904) (providing a compilation of all treaties and agreements between Indian tribes and
the United States).
106. See Frank Pommersheim, The Contextual Legitimacy of Adjudication in Tribal Courts
and the Role of the Tribal Bar as an Interpretive Community, 18 N.M. L. REv. 49, 60 (1988)
("Certainly there are (or have been) identifiable segments of most tribes that refuse to consider
tribal courts legitimate. In this regard, many tribal courts are vilified as 'white men's' creations
flowing from the IRA and an entire federal history directed to assimilation.")
107. Id. at 59-63. Examples of tribal courts' growing legitimacy are
the increase of the law trained Indian people within many systems, tribal and
constitutional code revision, the nascent development of traditional and customary
law, and the continued recognition of tribal courts by the United States Supreme
Court as viable and important forums for resolution of reservation based claims
involving both Indians and non-Indians.
Id. at 61 (footnote omitted).
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Nevertheless, Pommersheim recognizes that "[t]he process of striving for
legitimacy is far from over."" Thus, when formulating their response to
on-reservation environmental offenders, native governments should consider
whether their people would respect such institutions.
Tribal governments should also consider that adoption of Euro-American-
style institutions could affect tribal sovereignty. As more traditional ways
are replaced by Euro-American ways, tribal governments become less
distinguishable from states and municipalities. This impacts both the
internal and external perception of native individuality and autonomy.
Tribal governments, however, should not reject Euro-American methods for
sovereignty reasons alone, particularly when. tribes could both protect
sovereignty and adopt Euro-American methods for protecting tribal health
and environment. Euro-American methods could be molded to unique native
needs and philosophies, transforming Euro-American approaches into native
approaches.
The Navajo Peacemaker Court epitomizes the concept of melding native
tradition and Euro-American-style systems." Navajo tribal judges and bar
members actively sought to establish a methods for accommodating Navajo
common law in their Euro-American-style court system. With extensive
efforts, such as conducting studies, forming the nine-member Task Force on
Navajo Judiciary, interviewing Navajo judges and bar members, and
debating the proposed system, an amalgam of the traditional and the Euro-
American was created."' Navajo traditional mediation is the core of the
new court, and it is supported by a formal system that incorporates Euro-
American elements like appealability of decisions to a higher court (the
Navajo Court of Appeals)." In creating such a system, "the Navajo
judges believe they have chosen the correct method of blending Navajo
common law into an American-style court system.""' The Navajo
experience demonstrates that tribal schemes to protect reservation health and
environment from native entrepreneurs and midnight dumpers could
incorporate Euro-American-style institutions without necessarily sacrificing
their custom, philosophies, or autonomy.
1. Tribal Legislation
Complex considerations are involved in each phase of adopting a Euro-
American-style approach to regulating the reservation environment, from
creating laws, to utilizing tribal courts, to stepping up police power.
108. Id. at 62.
109. See generally James W. Zion, The Navajo Peacemaker Court: Deference to the Old and
Accommodation to the New, I 1 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 89 (1983).
110. Id. at 92-99.
II1. Id. at 100-01.
112. Id. at 109.
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Underlying the creation of environmental law and regulatory institutions are
complicated legal issues, ethical considerations, and health concerns. As is
true with any environmental regulatory program, these factors should be
addressed prior to implementation because informed decision making
decreases future dissatisfaction and potential harm.
A native government will need legal and scientific consultants to
consider the legal issues and health concerns that are associated with
creating environmental laws, as well as resources to compensate these
advisors. For governments who have both the financial and human
resources necessary, tribal environmental laws could be developed from
scratch, or based in part on state or federal laws to meet their unique needs.
Using funds provided by a commercial waste company, the Campo Band of
Mission Indians, for example, established tribal environmental codes suited
to their needs.' After consulting legal and scientific advisors, the Band
enacted legislation that was in many respects the most stringent and
Aggressive program in California."4
Native governments who lack financial and human resources could cut
costs by either adopting state or federal government laws verbatim, or,
simply by prohibiting any form of waste disposal operation that is
conducted for profit."5 However, these alternatives are satisfactory if the
native government has determined that such approaches are in its
environmental, economic, and sovereignty interests."6
Alternatively, the tribal governments could utilize traditional common
law in their tribal courts to address environmental concerns. As Associate
Justice Raymond Austin of the Navajo Nation Supreme Court reports:
"Navajo common law is the law of preference of the Courts of the Navajo
Nation [including, but not limited to, the Peacemaker Courts]. It is a corpus
of law based upon the values and norms of the Navajo people, as expressed
in their customs, usages and morals.""' But he goes on to recognize: "The
113. Gover & Walker, supra note 8, at 938-39; see also Daniel A. Spitzer, Maybe in my
Backyard: Strategies for Local Regulation of Private Solid Waste Facilities in New York, I BuFF.
ENVrL L.J. 87, 88-95, 117-46 (1993) (discussing strategies for rural communities, who are often
impoverished, to address the waste disposal industry's proposals).
[14. Gover & Walker, supra note 8, at 939.
[ 15. The Yankton Sioux of Marty, South Dakota, for example, barred all waste companies
from siting on their land. Linda Kanamine, Tribes Take on Waste Industry, USA TODAY, June
10, 1991, at 6A.
116. Of course the native government would still incur a minimal amount of personnel time
and expenses to investigate the appropriateness of such legislation. If the tribe already has legal
and ;cientific personnel on staff, the costs of considering an adoption proposal would be even
less. However, the cost would probably be minimal in comparison to compensating legal and
scientific consultants.
117. Raymond D. Austin, Incorporating Tribal Customs and Traditions into Tribal Courts
Decisions, Address Before the Federal Bar Association 1992 Indian Law Conference I (n.d.)
(transcript on file with author).
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Courts of the Navajo Nation are among the very few Indian Courts, if not
the only Indian legal system, which uses tribal common law to decide cases,
and which writes opinions based on that law." '118 While traditional
common law may be under-utilized for adapting the old to the new, it need
not remain that way. Formative tribal legal systems could look to the
Navajo for guidance in adopting such an approach.
Tribal legislation of any type, including use and recording of traditional
common law, is an important step for many native governments to take. A
tribe's traditional role is factored into the "preemption/infringement" test
which determines whether states have on-reservation authority."9 Thus, in
acting to protect reservation health and environment, the tribe
simultaneously protects its sovereignty.
2. Tribal Courts
After legislation is created or native common law is identified, the waste
disposal operator's unauthorized actions must be adjudged by those laws.
In Euro-American-style institutions this occurs in courts with an adversarial
framework. As with legislation, this approach may be molded to meet tribal
needs and philosophies. The Navajo Peacemaker Courts, for example, are
not adversarial, but provide mediators, or arbitrators upon request."
Meditation is a more traditional Navajo approach.'' The Navajo do
provide adversarial courts, however, to deal with matters that cannot be
mediated or arbitrated.' This demonstrates that tribal courts are not
bound to Euro-American form. What remains a constant, however, is that
upon creating or reformulating a tribal court system, internal and external
legitimacy and sovereignty should be considerations.
3. Tribal Sanction and Enforcement
After a judgment is secured against an illegal operator, what sanctions
may be imposed and how are they to be enforced? The ICRA places a limit
on tribal sanctions." Tribal governments may "in no event impose for
conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than
imprisonment for a term of one year or a fine of $5,000, or both."'24
Illegal dumping can cause substantial harm to reservation health and
environmental costing possibly thousands or millions in clean up and human
health costs. The sanction limits of ICRA are not commensurate with these
118. Id. at 6.
119. See supra part I1I.C.
120. Zion, supra note 109, at 102-03.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).
124. Id. § 1302(7).
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harms. A solution to this inequity may be drafting tribal legislation which
defines an offense as a daily occurrence. Therefore, the fine would accrue
$5000 for each day the activity or harm continued. As well, the tribal
government could legislate closely related laws so that a violation of the
first law would almost guarantee a violation of the second (careful drafting
will avoid double jeopardy concerns). With the aid of clever legislation,
justice can be done, despite ICRA's intrusive limitations."~
Another problem facing tribal governments is enforcing the tribal court
judgment. Illegal operators already act with disregard for tribal authority
when they conduct their unauthorized activity. Absent an adequate
enforcement mechanism, judgment and sanctions against them alone
probably would not be meaningful. Even if the tribe has these mechanisms,
they may not be enough. The Seneca Nation of Indians, located in western
New York, has a regulatory force, yet there is also a provision in New York
law for the enforcement of tribal court judgments."z While this is done
infrequently,'" it provides added incentive for litigants to honor tribal
court judgment and to respect the tribal court process. Problems may be
inherent with outside assistance, but occasionally exigent circumstances
require an extraordinary response.
4. Overview
A Euro-American-style approach to the problems of environmental
offenders presents native governments a unique opportunity. Such an
approach would likely receive approval from the federal and state
governments, and thereby ward offjurisdictional encroachment attempts like
125. This presupposes, of course, that a tribe wishes to draft Euro-American-style
environmental legislation. See supra part V.A.I.
126. N.Y. INDIAN LAw § 52 (McKinney 1950). The statute states:
If any party shall fail to comply with, or fulfill the directions or finding of the
peacemakers-in any matter heard or determined by them in pursuance of law,
within the time fixed by such determination, the party in whose favor such
determination may be, shall be entitled to recover the amount awarded to him, by
such determination with costs, in an action in justice's court before any justice of
the peace of the county in which such reservation or part thereof is situated, in
which action, a copy of the record of such determination, certified to by said clerk,
shall be conclusive evidence of the right of recovery, and of the amount of such
recovery, and executions shall be awarded to enforce the collection of the
judgment obtained thereon in the same manner and with the like effect as against
white persons, and the property and person of the defendant in such action shall
be liable to seizure and sale or imprisonment, as in like cases against white
persons. In case the action or proceeding is one not within the jurisdiction of
justice's courts, the application may be made to a court having jurisdiction of
actions of the same nature.
Id.
127. Silverheels v. Maybee, 143 N.Y.S. 655 (Sup. Ct. 1913), is the most recently reported
case concerning the enforcement of this provision.
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ITGWMA and the Peace Bill. Furthermore, adopting methods to address
environmental offenders will establish a "traditional role" in regulating the
activity, which courts find influential in determining whether state or tribal
jurisdiction controls.'" A Etiro-American-style approach is also attractive
because, as demonstrated by the Navajo, traditional native ways and
philosophies can be easily incorporated.
Despite these favorable considerations, a Euro-American-style system has
potentially negative attributes as well. If this approach is not adapted to
native needs and philosophies, it could undermine the individuality of native
groups, disregard traditional strengths, create a perception of sacrificed
sovereignty, and be ineffective. A general criticism of the Euro-American-
style approach is that it is reactive, as opposed to proactive. Based on the
inherent structure of the system (which operates in the order of: offense,
adjudication, enforcement), many harms will result before they are
addressed. Arguably, reactive institutions provide deterrence to potential
offenders, but, looking at the number of violators in the federal and state
systems, the deterrence value is questionable. The Euro-American-style
approach is not a panacea. It can be improved upon. Native governments
have the liberty to do so and should-if they contemplate adopting a Euro-
American-style approach for dealing with native entrepreneurs and midnight
dumpers.
B. Contract for State Assistance
Article 8.6 of the California Health and Safety Code'" and section 52
of New York Indian Law"u present an interesting consideration for tribal
governments wanting to formulate a meaningful response to the threats
posed by midnight dumpers and native entrepreneurs. Tribes could contract
for state assistance with environmental programs. California's article 8.6
codified California's offer to assist with tribal hazardous waste facility
regulation in exchange for satisfaction of California environmental laws at
tribal regulated facilities.'3 ' New York's section 52 is more limited; New
York agrees to enforce Seneca Peacemaker Court judgments.'
According to individual tribal needs, varying degrees of state assistance
may be sought by native governments. The less technical and financial
resources a tribe has, the more extensive its agreement with the state could
be. For example, a tribe may need technical assistance with developing and
128. See supra part III.C.
129. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25198.1-.9 (West 1992 & Supp. 1994).
130. N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 52 (McKinney 1950).
131. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25198.3-.6.
132. N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 52 (McKinney 1950). Interestingly, the name of the Seneca
Peacemaker Court may be the origin of the name of the Navajo Peacemaker Court. See Zion,
supra note 109, at 96.
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administering a tribal environmental program, or a tribe may only have
problems with enforcement of its program. California and New York's laws
provide legislative guidance in both scenarios.
Of course, a state must also be interested in forming an agreement to
provide assistance to a tribe. But, as evidenced by the State of Washington's
attempt to assert on-reservation environmental authority,"' states have an
interest in obtaining on-reservation authority. This interest, however, also
highlights the major drawback with contracting for state assistance. Tribal
sovereignty may be sacrificed by acquiescence to any degree of state on-
reservation authority, particularly if the agreement provides for waiver of
tribal sovereign immunity, as does California's article 8.6."
Arguably, sovereignty does not suffer as much when outside assistance
is requested, rather than imposed. Furthermore, states may gain on-
reservation authority - or the federal government may be prompted to
exert more of its plenary power over the reservation environment - if tribal
governments do not remedy reservation environmental problems. Thus, a
tribe who is without means to create a regulatory system may merely be
preempting another government's seemingly inevitable assertion of authority.
By initiating the agreement which allows another government more power,
the tribal government can bargain for more favorable terms than otherwise
may have been imposed. Furthermore, tribal governments may view this as
a necessary, even though extreme, step to protect its people from
environmental harms and health threats.
As with all the recommendations suggested in this article, tribal
governments should consider if the proposed alternative is compatible with
tribal needs and philosophy, as well as being in their long-term interest.
With state contracting, this caveat especially applies. Once a state has on-
reservation authority of any type, it may be difficult to later divest.
C. Intertribal Agreements
To combat tribal financial and resource deficiencies, tribal governments
could pool their expertise and resources. Intertribal cooperative agreements
could be created where personnel, equipment, and information are shared
among Indian tribes. Environmental advisors and field workers could
service the different tribes. Laboratory equipment could be jointly
purchased, and lab technicians employed and paid by all involved. Legal
advisors may be employed in a similar fashion. This approach would save
financial resources by minimizing repetition and spreading the costs, as well
as account for trained personnel shortages.
Geographical constraints or traditional antagonistic relations with other
tribes may limit the feasibility of intertribal agreements. But, in contrast,
133. Washington Dept of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
134. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25198.7(b).
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol19/iss1/4
ENVIRONMENTAL OFFENSES
geography and traditional relations may make intertribal agreements more
viable. The Six Nations of the Iroquois is a prime example. There exists a
traditional allegiance among the Cayuga, Onondaga, Oneida, Mohawk,
Seneca, and Tuscarora Nations. '35 Today, most of these nations are located
within New York, albeit widely dispersed throughout New York. These
factors provide fodder for the growth of a present-day tribal environmental
allegiance of sorts.
While geography may prevent some tribes from sharing resources and
personnel, information sharing has few impediments. With the prevalence
of faxes and modems (or even use of the mail), tribes could create a
network for sharing information. A computer network, a clearinghouse, or
even a predesignated mailing chain could provide information concerning
known offenders, types of activities, methods of offenders, and successful
and unsuccessful tribal responses to environmental offenses. With minimal
effort, tribes could find strength in unification against illegal operators.
D. Information Provider and Facilitator
Information is vital to the successful functioning of a tribal regulatory
system.3 The tribal government, for example, must know what is
introduced onto the reservation in order to respond with adequate speed and
discipline. Furthermore, native communities who know midnight dumping
is a regular.offense on their land and who appreciate the threat midnight
dumpers pose would be alert to this dumping, take it more seriously, and
be more apt to notify tribal authorities of suspicious activities. Information
about the dangers of unregulated waste disposal operations could also
dissuade potential native entrepreneurs and unify a community against
native entrepreneurs. However, in the face of the great wealth native
entrepreneurs stand to gain, these entrepreneurs may be indifferent to the
community's opinion or may isolate themselves from it.'31 Community
opinion, nevertheless, may provide the impetus needed for tribal
governments to address these offenders in a meaningful manner.
Tribal governments are in a position to provide information to their
communities and facilitate the two-way flow of information. They could
provide communities with general information about the presence and threat
of illegal operators and give specific information abut noxious substances,
135. COHEN, supra note 23, at 416-24.
136. Cf. David A. Niles, Hard Habits to Break. Information and Mutual Mistrust in the
Regulation of Corporate Polluters, I BuFF. ENvTL. L. 149, 150-56 (1993) (discussing the
importance of the information flow between regulator and regulatee to the effectiveness of a
regulatory system).
137. Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1880, 1916 (1991) ("Mhose people who are most likely to defy social norms and risk shaming
sanctions, even within close knit groups, are the very rich .... The rich can afford to defy the
norms because they are insulated by their wealth.").
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their effects, and what to do if exposed. In return, communities may
provide tribal governments with details about who the illegal operators are,
where they are operating, what is being disposed of, and where the waste
originated.
Low-cost activities like conferences, presentations, or tribe-sponsored
environmental groups are ways to facilitate the needed exchange of
information. Of course, a tribal community alone could engage in these
activities without the help of the tribal government. 3 ' Tribal governments,
however, should take a more active role to ensure, that community members
are aware that they may encounter noxious substances from illegal
dumpings and inform them of what to do if they are exposed. Highlighting
this point is the story of Sally Jones, an Indian, who "landed in the hospital
with lung damage and rashes after trying to wash out an old barrel."'' 9
The unsuspecting deserve a warning, and surely the illegal operators will
not provide it. Tribal governments should fill this role, especially when this
exchange of information may have deterrence and policing value that
benefits the whole tribe.
VI. Conclusion
Midnight dumpers and native entrepreneurs threaten native health,
environment, and sovereignty. Tribal governments presently have the
jurisdictional ability to simultaneously rectify the problem of illegal
dumpers and create a regulatory system which accommodates tribal needs
and philosophies. However, if tribal governments do not exert this
authority, it may be lost. Outside authority may eventually impose a
regulatory system upon them.
Numerous alternative regulatory approaches are available to tribal
governments. Considerations of sovereignty, internal and external
legitimacy, and tribal health pervade these alternatives. It matters more that
a tribal government undertakes these considerations than which
alternative(s) they adopt. Protection of tribal health and environment, as
well -as long-term satisfaction are more likely if the approach is well-suited
to individual tribal concerns.
Kakumee was driven by greed to disobey the unwritten, but well-known,
tribal law. His actions were so foreign to his people that they were
stupefied into inaction. They did not adapt their traditional approach to
prevent his future social deviance, and their culture was lost because of it.
The greed of midnight dumpers and native entrepreneurs can irreparably
138. For example, students in the Native American Indian Alliance at the State University
of New York at Buffalo organized a three-day conference, "Dumping on Native American Lands,"
which was held in Buffalo, N.Y., on April 10-11, 1992.
139. Lambrecht, Illegal Dumpers, supra note 14.
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harm native groups today. Tribal governments should prevent illegal
operators' future social deviance, and thereby protect their people from the
present-day Kakumees.
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